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COPYRIGHT LAW: THE RELEVANCE OF BAD FAITH TO A FAIR
USE ANALYSIS
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004)
Melisa San Martin*

Appellant is a producer of business seminar training programs and
provides seminar materials on a web site accessible only to paid
subscribers.' Appellee runs nonprofit web sites that provide information
to the public about controversial groups.2 Appellee indirectly obtained a
copy of Appellant's manuscript and issued reports on his web site that
analyzed and critiqued Appellant's materials.3 Appellant brought suit for
copyright infringement under section 106 of the Copyright Act4 and
alleged that Appellee infringed the company's course materials by posting
portions of the materials on the Internet.5 Appellant moved for preliminary
injunction.6 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
denied the preliminary injunction; holding that Appellee' s fair use defense
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1. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. Appellee learned of Appellant's business seminars in the course of his business as a
for-profit "cult-deprogrammer." Id. Appellee obtained the Appellant's manuscript from a one-time
NXIVM participant Stephanie Franco. Id.
4. Id. at 476. Section 106 of the Copyright Act states,
Subject to sections 107 ... the owner of a copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies... ; (2) to prepare the derivative works based on the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies .
of the copyrighted work to the
public....
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004).
5. NXIVMCorp., 364 F.3d at 476. Appellant challenged NXIVM on two additional grounds.
First, trademark disparagement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and second,
interference with contractual relations under state law. Id.
6. Id.Appellants moved for preliminary injunction on the copyright infringement claim and
sought an order requiring Appellee to remove the copyrighted material from the web site. Id. In a
copyright case, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show irreparable harm in the absence
of the injunction, which can be met by proof of a likelihood of success on the merits. Id.
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was likely to succeed.! Appellant appealed the decision and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's denial.' In
affirming the district court's opinion, the instant court HELD, that even
though the district court did not fully consider the propriety of Appellee's
conduct, the fair use doctrine defeats any likelihood of Appellant's success
on the merits.9
To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must establish
that it owns a valid copyright and a defendant has engaged in unauthorized
copying of the copyrighted material.'0 While the law recognizes an
original author's exclusive rights to a copyrighted work, section 107 of the
Copyright Act limits these rights if a defendant engages in a fair use of the
copyrighted work." Congress has identified and codified four nonexclusive factors 2 to be considered on a case-by-case basis in determining
the applicability of the fair use defense. 3 The manner in which courts

7. Id. The injunction was denied because Appellee defeated Appellant's prima facie
showing of infringement by proving that their actions are protected by the fair use doctrine. Id.The
fair use doctrine is an affirmative defense that provides defendants in a copyright case the
opportunity to defeat any likelihood of a plaintiffs success on the merits. See id. at 477.
8. Id at 476. The instant court reviewed the district court's denial on an abuse of discretion
standard but noted the option of affirming the decision on any ground supported by the record. Id.;
see also Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that a "district
court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on a mistaken application of the law or a clearly
erroneous finding of fact").
9. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 477, 482.
10. Id. at 476. (citing ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.
1996)). This constitutes aprimafacie showing of infringement. Id
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985). Copyright law does not prevent subsequent users from engaging in fair use of the
copyrighter's original work. Id. at 548.
12. Section 107 of the Copyright Act states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106. . . , the fair use of a copyrighted
work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
13. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,577 (1994). The fair use doctrine
recognizes that the goals of the Copyright Act are better served by allowing a use of a copyrighted
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analyze the first of the four statutory factors - the purpose and character
of a defendant's use of a copyrighted work - is a controversial topic in
copyright infringement suits. 4 Some argue that the propriety of a
defendant's conduct is an integral part of the analysis, while others
maintain that this consideration is irrelevant and should have no bearing
on the success of a fair use defense.' 5
This debate is primarily due to the decision in Harper & Row
Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,6 in which the Court added a good
faith principle to the analysis of the fair use defense's first statutory
factor.' 7 The Harper & Row Court found that defendant's unauthorized,
commercial use of verbatim excerpts from plaintiff's unpublished
manuscript was not a fair use. 8 In evaluating the first factor, the Court
focused its analysis on the commercial motive and the "propriety of the
defendant's conduct."' 9 In reasoning that "fair use presupposes good faith
and fair dealing," the Court determined that because the defendant
magazine knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript with the intended
purpose of displacing plaintiff's right of first publication, defendant's
actions weighed against a finding of fair use.2" Evaluating the remaining
statutory factors, the Court ultimately found that the fair use defense did
not apply.2 '
After the Harper& Row Court incorporated a good faith principle into
the first factor analysis, subsequent courts have disagreed about how much
weight should be placed on this subfactor.22 While acknowledging the
relevance of Harper & Row, the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.23
court based its decision on the proposition that the bad-faith subfactor,
although considered, should not be weighed very heavily within the

work, rather than prohibiting it. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409,412(1997)
(quoting Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
14. See generallyNXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 477-79.
15. See id.at 478.
16. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
17. See id.at 562; see also NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 478.
18. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
19. See id. at 562-63.
20. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.at 569. In addition, the Court found the third factor to weigh in favor of plaintiff
because defendant's infringing article was structured around the quoted excerpts. Id.at 566. Lastly,
the Court determined that defendant's magazine adversely affected the market of the original
copyrighted manuscripts. Id. at 568-69. In reaching its conclusion, the Court ultimately determined
that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Id. at 566.
22. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479.
23. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 9

analysis of the first fair use factor.2 4 In Campbell, the Supreme Court
modified the fair use analysis used in Harper & Row and found that
petitioner music group's commercial parody of respondent record
company's copyrighted song was not a direct copyright infringement." In
Campbell, petitioner was denied permission to use the parody of
respondent's original song even though they were willing to afford all
credit for the original to respondent.26 The Campbell Court determined that
being denied permission to use a copyrighted work does not weigh against
a finding of fair use.27 In contrast to Harper& Row, the Campbell Court's
analysis focused primarily on the transformative nature of the new work
and suggested that good faith is not a central concern in the first factor
analysis of the fair use defense.28
One year later the Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.29 court confronted the same uncertainty
regarding the first factor of the fair use analysis. 30 In Religious
Technology, Religious Technology Center ' brought a copyright
infringement action against the defendant for posting a large portion of the
Church's copyrighted works on the Internet.3 2 Defendant published the
Church's original works on a noncommercial web site for purposes of
criticism. 33 The Religious Technology court attempted to evaluate the
defendant's conduct, but due to a lack of evidence, was unable to

24. Id. at 585 n.18.
25. See id. at 594. The Campbell Court emphasized the transformative nature of the new
work and reasoned that the commercial nature of the work was only one factor to be considered.
Id. But see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (holding
that a commercial purpose of defendant's work bears a presumption of unfair use).
26. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572-73.
27. Id. at 585 n. 18 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)).
28. See id. at 585 n. 18. A secondary work is "transformative" of the original if it "adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character" and in doing so, creates a new
meaning. Id. at 579.
29. 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
30. Id. at 1244-45.
31. Religious Technology Center (RTC) is a nonprofit organization formed by scientologists
and is affiliated with the Church of Scientology. Id. at 1239.
32. Id. at 1239-40. "The Church" refers to the Church of Scientology. Id. at 1238-39.
Defendant Erlich was a member of the Church and had access to many of its writings and
confidential works. Id. at 1239. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant misappropriated Plaintiffs'
trade secrets and that the works were valuable to the Church. Id.
33. Id. at 1243. Because plaintiffs did not provide evidence that defendant's work was not
for purposes of criticism, the Religious Technology court assumed that defendant's intended
purpose was criticism. Id. A use of the original work for the purpose of criticism or comment
weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. Id.
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determine whether his possession of the copyrighted material was lawful.34
Thus, in analyzing the first factor of the fair use defense, the Religious
Technology court determined that even if the copies were obtained through
deceit, this fact should not be dispositive of the entire fair use defense.35
The Religious Technology court interpreted the Harper& Row opinion to
encourage an analysis beyond solely a defendant's bad faith.36
Specifically, the Religious Technology Court reasoned that "[n]othing in
Harper & Row indicates that the defendant's bad faith was itself
conclusive of the fair use question, or even of the first factor."37
The instant court inherited the same ambiguity regarding the fair use
analysis and, like Harper& Row, Campbell, and Religious Technology,
was faced with the challenge of analyzing the fair use defense in light of
an individual's bad faith.38 Thus, the instant court was presented with the
opportunity to examine the relevance of the propriety of a defendant's39
conduct and once and for all, establish its relevance to a fair use defense.
The instant court, in addressing Appellant's motion for preliminary
injunction, evaluated Appellee's fair use defense by analyzing each
statutory factor.4 °
In evaluating the first factor, the instant court found that Appellee's use
of quotations to create the web site transformed Appellant's original
manuscript.4 ' Moreover, the instant court rejected the notion that
Appellee's concurrent commercial business was dispositive for finding
against a fair use defense. 42 The instant court agreed with Appellant,
however, that the district court failed to fully consider the "propriety of a
defendant's conduct" as an integral part of its analysis.43 The instant court
majority reasoned that, to the extent Appellee was aware that access to the
manuscript was unauthorized, this consideration weighed in favor of
34. Religious Tech., 923 F. Supp. at 1245.
35. Id.
36. See id.at 1244 n.14.
37. Id.
38. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471,475 (2d Cir. 2004). In this appeal, the circuit
court focused on determining the weight a defendant's bad faith should be given within first
statutory factor of a fair use analysis, in light of the Harper& Row opinion. Id.
39. Id. at 477-78.
40. See generally id.at 477-82.
41. Id.at 477.
42. See id. at 477-78; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85
(1994) (reasoning that Congress could not have intended a rule that commercial uses are
presumptively unfair). Appellant's criticisms of Appellee were posted on a nonprofit web site, but
the web site was connected with Appellant's for-profit business as a "cult de-programmer." NXIVM
Corp., 364 F.3d at 475.
43. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 478.
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Appellant.44 While acknowledging Appellee's bad faith, the instant court
ultimately concluded that the first factor favored Appellee because of the
transformative nature of the secondary work for purposes of criticism.'"
In his concurring opinion, Judge Jacobs criticized the majority's
emphasis on Harper & Row, contending that Appellee's conduct in
gaining access to Appellant's original, copyrighted manuscript should
' Judge Jacobs
have "no bearing on the availability of a fair use defense."46
asserted that Harper& Row's emphasis on a defendant's bad faith was an
additional observation unnecessary to the outcome of the case because the
other statutory factors weighed so heavily in plaintiff's favor.47
Applying the principle that one factor should not dominate a fair use
analysis, the instant court ultimately affirmed the district court's denial of
the preliminary injunction.4" Regrettably for Appellant, the instant court
based its opinion on the notion that all statutory factors must be considered
and "the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright"
and the fair use defense.49
The instant court majority bases its first factor analysis on the Harper
& Row notion that the "propriety of a defendant's conduct" is an essential
subfactor of the fair use analysis.5" The instant court rules that an
evaluation of defendant's conduct is necessary for a complete fair use
analysis.51 For example, the instant court emphasizes that if Appellee had
knowingly accessed Appellant's manuscript in an unauthorized manner
when he could have done so legitimately, then Appellee's bad faith would
work against him.52 Moreover, the instant court finds it significant that
Appellee refused to lawfully access the copyrighted materials.53 The court

44. Id.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 483 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (stating that the fair use defense should be analyzed
according to the central objectives of copyright law and further reasoned that such goals would not
be advanced if dependent on a defendant's morality).
47. Id. (Jacobs, J., concurring). In Harper& Row, defendant copied the "heart" of plaintiff s
original work and, in doing so, quashed plaintiff's commercial right of first publication and
adversely affected plaintiff's market. Id.(Jacobs, J., concurring).
48. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 482.
49. Id.(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 10 U.S. 569, 578 (1994)).
50. Id.at 478 (citing Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991)).
51. Id
52. Id.
53. See NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 478. The instant court also notes that evidence of a
violation of an enforceable contractual duty would be significant to a bad faith analysis. See id.at
478 n. 1.
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specifically notes that
Appellee could have paid a fee to enroll in
5 4
Appellant's seminar.
While abiding by the Harper & Row decision, the instant court
interprets its holding narrowly. For example, the instant court finds the
Harper & Row decision applicable in situations where a defendant both
exercised bad faith and failed to make a transformative use of the
copyrighted work. 6 The instant court distinguishes Harper& Row because
in that case, not only did defendant have a bad faith intent to preempt the
plaintiffs first publication rights, but defendant also failed to make any
transformative use of plaintiff's unpublished manuscripts." In the instant
case, however, Appellee's use of the copyrighted manuscripts was both
critical and transformative. 8 Moreover, unlike in Harper& Row, further
evaluation of the statutory factors weighed in favor of Appellee. 9 Thus,
the instant court interpreted the Harper& Row opinion to require a more
complete analysis of the first factor than merely the propriety of a
defendant's conduct.60
Judge Jacobs's concurring opinion solidifies the notion that a proper
fair use analysis should be conducted in light of each statutory factor and
not solely on the defendant's conduct. 6' The concurrence minimizes the
relevance of Harper& Row's bad faith analysis and instead finds support
in Campbell'sdiscussion on whether the new work is transformative of the
original.62 Judge Jacobs observes that Appellee's use of the original work
was transformative and thus did not affect Appellant's share of the
market.63

54. Id
55. Id. Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (holding that good
faith does not bar a finding of infringement), with Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975
F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that an individual must possess an authorized copy of the
original work to invoke the fair use defense).
56. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 478 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
57. Id. at 479.
58. Id.
59. See generally id. at 480-82.
60. See id. at 479; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 n. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (supporting
the proposition that Harper& Row does not indicate that a defendant's bad faith is dispositive of
the fair use analysis).
61. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 485-86. (Jacobs, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 485 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 483 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
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Furthermore, Judge Jacobs concludes that fair use is a codified right,
not a doctrine that is earned by "good works and clean morals."'
Consequently, Judge Jacobs finds merit in the Campbell court's
proposition that the fair use defense exists to further the goals of
copyright: the creation and progress of new transformative works.65
Importantly, Judge Jacobs determines that copyright is not about "virtue"
and its goals are not advanced if bad faith constitutes copyright
infringement.66
While the majority is not as critical of the Harper& Row analysis as
Judge Jacobs, it certainly finds merit in the Religious Technology
analysis.67 In Religious Technology, the court considered plaintiffs
argument that defendant' s copies were made from unauthorized copies, but
reasoned that because there was no evidence that defendant took credit for
plaintiff's work or profited from the web site postings, the first factor
weighed in favor of defendant.6" Similarly to the defendant in Religious
Technology, Appellee did not attempt to take credit for Appellant's
training materials, nor did he intend to profit from such postings.69 The
instant court follows the Religious Technology reasoning which did not

concurring).
64. Id. at 485 (Jacobs, J.,
concurring) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569,
65. Id.(Jacobs, J.,
575 (1994)). Judge Jacobs also emphasized that bad faith is a difficult concept to define and relying
on such a consideration may hinder the goals of copyright because an otherwise transformative
work may not be published if the mental state of the defendant is not certain. Id. (Jacobs, J.,
concurring). Moreover, Judge Jacobs emphasized that the two crucial inquiries in a fair use analysis
include whether the secondary work is transformative of the original and if the infringing work
would diminish or prejudice the sale of the original owner's materials. Id. at 486 (Jacobs, J.,
concurring). In the instant case, the two crucial inquiries both weighed in Appellee's favor. Id. at
486 (Jacobs, J.,concurring). Not only was Appellee's web-site transformative of Appellant's
original training manuscripts, the web site's criticisms did not substitute for'Appellant's seminar
or training itself. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 485 (Jacobs, J., concurring). Judge Jacobs reasoned
that because these inquiries are not dependent on whether a defendant's access to the original is
authorized, such an inquiry as to a defendant's mental state is unnecessary. Id. (Jacobs, J.,
concurring).
66. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 485 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
67. Id.at 479 (quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 n. 14 (1995)) (stating that the bad faith of a defendant is not dipositive of
a fair use defense).
68. See Religious Tech., 923 F. Supp. at 1244-45 (finding a lack of evidence indicating that
defendant obtained his copies through deceit and confirming that there was no evidence that
defendant admitted to not possessing any legal copies).
69. NXIVMCorp., 364 F.3d at 475; see ReligiousTech., 923 F. Supp. at 1244-45 (finding that
defendant was not personally profiting from his work, nor was he attempting to take any credit
away from plaintiff).
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dismiss the Harper & Row "good faith" analysis, but limited its
significance in the first factor analysis.7"
The instant court majority, similarly to the concurrence, also finds
support in the Campbell proposition that a defendant's good or bad faith
is not overly significant.7 In Campbell, the Court reasoned that being
denied permission to use the copyrighted work could not be offered as
72
evidence to prove that defendants believed that their use was unfair.
Finding support in Campbell, the instant court ultimately determined that
a defendant's faith is not to be weighed very heavily within the first
factor.73 Despite this reasoning, however, the instant court was determined
to adhere to the Harper74& Row assumption that "fair use presupposes good
faith and fair dealing.
While the instant court majority attempted to reexamine the Supreme
Court's holding in Harper& Row, it did so hesitantly. 7" Despite finding
that a court should consider a defendant's conduct in a fair use analysis,
the instant court did not clarify the significance, if any, the Harper& Row
decision should have in future cases.76 Unless the U.S. Supreme Court
clarifies the relevance of a defendant's bad faith in a fair use analysis, the
process of weighing a defendant's mental state with the other statutory
factors will not only remain a cumbersome and inconsistent task, but may
lose its importance all together.'

70. See NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479.
71. See id. at 479 n.2 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18
(1994)).
72. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
73. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479 n.2. The instant court found merit in the Campbell
reasoning but chose to follow the Harper& Row court. Id
74. Id. at 479; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985).
75. NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479 n.2. The instant court recognized that a finding of bad
faith is not central to a fair use analysis, but stated that it would await a more precise description
from the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally id.
at 484-86 (Jacobs, J.,
concurring).

